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A wide body of empirical evidence, based on randomized experiments, finds that 20-40 percent of
fiscal stimulus payments (e.g. tax rebates) are spent on nondurable household consumption in the quarter
that they are received. We develop a structural economic model to interpret this evidence. Our model
integrates the classical Baumol-Tobin model of money demand into the workhorse incomplete-markets
life-cycle economy. In this framework, households can hold two assets: a low-return liquid asset (e.g.,
cash, checking account) and a high-return illiquid asset (e.g., housing, retirement account) that carries
a transaction cost. The optimal life-cycle pattern of wealth accumulation implies that many households
are  "wealthy hand-to-mouth" : they hold little or no liquid wealth despite owning sizeable quantities
of illiquid assets. They therefore display large propensities to consume out of additional income. We
document the existence of such households in data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. A version
of the model parameterized to the 2001 tax rebate episode is able to generate consumption responses
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Fiscal stimulus payments (i.e., transfers to households such as tax rebates) are frequently used
by governments to alleviate the impact of recessions on households’ welfare. In the last decade,
this type of ﬁscal intervention was authorized by U.S. Congress in the downturns of 2001, 2008,
and 2009.1 Households received one-oﬀ payments between $500 and $1,000, depending on the
speciﬁc episode. In the aggregate, these ﬁscal outlays were remarkably large: $38B in 2001,
$79B in 2008, and $60B in 2009, roughly equivalent to 0.5% of annual GDP.
On the empirical side, substantial progress has been made in measuring the size of household
consumption responses to the tax rebate episodes of 2001 and 2008. Using data from the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006, hereafter JPS), Parker,
Souleles, Johnson, and McLelland (2011, hereafter PSJM), and Misra and Surico (2011) cleverly
exploit the randomized timing of the receipt of payments to estimate the eﬀects of the ﬁscal
stimulus payments on consumption expenditures. Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a, 2003b, 2009,
hereafter SS) substantiate these studies with a detailed qualitative survey on how consumers
use their rebate.
This collective body of evidence convincingly concludes that between 20 and 40 percent of
rebates are spent by households on nondurables in the quarter that they are received. This
strong consumption response is measured relative to the (comparable, because of the random-
ization) group of households who are arguably aware of the rebate but had not yet received their
check. Two crucial ﬁndings are encoded in this fact: 1) the marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) out of the extra cash is large; 2) the MPC out of the news of the extra cash is small.
In spite of this large body of empirical research, there are virtually no quantitative studies of
these episodes within structural, dynamic, forward-looking models. Such a gap in the literature
is troubling because thoroughly understanding the eﬀectiveness of tax rebates as a short-term
stimulus for aggregate consumption is paramount for macroeconomists and policy makers.2
1In the context of the latest downturn, Oh and Reis (2011) document that, contrary to common belief, large
ﬁscal expansion of 2007-09 consisted primarily of growing social assistance, as opposed to government purchases.
Half of this expansion comprised of discretionary ﬁscal stimulus transfers.
2The JPS (2006) estimates feature prominently in the reports prepared by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce
(CBO, 2009) and the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA, 2010) documenting and forecasting the macroeco-
nomic eﬀects of ﬁscal stimulus.
1Knowing the determinants of how consumers respond to stimulus payments helps in choosing
among the policy options and in understanding whether the same ﬁscal instrument can be
expected to be more or less eﬀective under diﬀerent macroeconomic conditions.3
To develop a structural model that has some hope of matching the micro evidence is a chal-
lenging task: ‘oﬀ-the-shelf’ consumption theory —the rational expectations, life-cycle, buﬀer-
stock model (Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1992, 1997; Rios-Rull, 1995; Huggett, 1996)— predicts that
the MPC out of anticipated transitory income ﬂuctuations, such as the tax rebates, should be
negligible in the aggregate. In that model, the only agents whose consumption would react
signiﬁcantly to the receipt of a rebate check are those who are constrained. However, under
plausible parameterizations where the model’s distribution of net worth is in line with the data,
the fraction of constrained households is too small (usually below 10%) to generate a big enough
response in the aggregate.
In this paper we overcome this challenge by proposing a quantitative framework that can
speak to the data on both liquid and illiquid wealth, rather than net worth alone. To do this, we
integrate the classical Baumol-Tobin model of money demand into the workhorse incomplete-
markets life-cycle economy. In our model, households can hold two assets: a liquid asset (e.g.,
cash, or bank account) and an illiquid asset (e.g., housing, or retirement wealth). Illiquid
assets earn a higher return but can be accessed only by paying a transaction cost. The model is
parameterized to replicate a number of macroeconomic, life-cycle, and cross-sectional targets.
Besides the usual small fraction of agents with zero net worth, our model features a signiﬁ-
cant number of what we call “wealthy hand-to-mouth” households. These are households who
hold sizeable amounts of illiquid wealth, yet optimally choose to consume all of their disposable
income during a pay-period. Examining asset portfolio and income data from the 2001 Survey
and Consumer Finances (SCF) through the lens of our two-asset model reveals that between
1/4 and 1/3 of US households ﬁt this proﬁle.4 Although in our model these households act as
if they are ‘constrained’, such households would not appear constrained from the viewpoint of
3JPS (2006) conclude their empirical analysis of the 2001 tax rebates with: “without knowing the full struc-
tural model underlying these results, we cannot conclude that future tax rebates will necessarily have the same
eﬀect.” (page 1607). SS (2003a) conclude theirs with “key parameters such as the propensity to consume are
contingent on aggregate conditions in ways that are diﬃcult to anticipate.” (page 394)
4Our ﬁnding is consistent with recent survey evidence in Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano (2011).
2the one-asset model since they own substantial net worth.5
It is because of these wealthy hand-to-mouth households that the model can generate much
higher average consumption responses to ﬁscal stimulus payments compared to the standard
one-asset model: such households do not respond to the news of the rebate, and have a high
MPC when they receive the payment. When we replicate, by simulation, the randomized exper-
iment associated with the tax rebate of 2001 within our structural model, we ﬁnd consumption
responses of comparable magnitude to those estimated in the micro data, i.e., around 25%.
Two key features of the macroeconomic environment of 2001 act as important ampliﬁcation
mechanisms in the model: the Bush tax reform, and the 2001 recession. By raising future per-
manent income relative to current income, both components exacerbate liquidity constraints
at the time of the rebate.
The presence of wealthy hand-to-mouth households represents a strong ampliﬁcation mech-
anism relative to the one-asset model economy, where average consumption responses to the
ﬁscal stimulus payments are only 3%. Clearly, even the one-asset model could, under extreme
parameterizations where many agents hold close to zero net worth and are often constrained,
predict large consumption responses. This explains the sizeable MPC out of lump-sum tax cuts
reported in some of Heathcote’s (2005) experiments.6
Existing macroeconomic applications of the Baumol-Tobin model are essentially limited to
ﬁnancial issues and monetary policy.7 We argue that this is also a natural environment in
5Recently, Hall (2011) has also adopted the view that the degree of illiquidity in household wealth is useful
to understand aggregate ﬂuctuations and the eﬀects of macroeconomic policy.
6A recent paper by the CBO (Huntley and Michelangeli, 2011) reports ﬁnding high MPC out of tax rebates
in the one-asset model precisely because its calibration implies a disproportionate fraction of households with
zero net worth. In a similar spirit to our approach, Huntley and Michelangeli (2011) extend the model to allow
households to hold taxable and tax-deferred assets. However, the ampliﬁcation in MPC they obtain compared
to the benchmark one-asset model is barely signiﬁcant (between 2 and 4 pct points).
7Building on Miller and Orr (1966), Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980, 1981) study the optimal precautionary
demand for money, and the optimal international reserves in a stochastic framework. Jovanovic (1982) analyzes
the welfare cost of inﬂation; Romer (1986) and Chatterjee and Corbae (1992) studied a deterministic, OLG
version of the Baumol-Tobin model that, as we explain below, bear some resemblance to our model during
the retirement phase. More recently, within equilibrium complete markets models, Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe
(2002) and Kahn and Thomas (2009) study how transaction costs lead to endogenous asset market segmentation
and real eﬀects of monetary injections. Within incomplete-markets economies, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) focus
on the equity premium and the low frequency of trading equities; Imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991) introduce
a ﬁxed per-period participation cost of bond holdings to support equilibria where money has value; Erosa and
Ventura (2002) and Bai (2005) revisit, quantitatively, the question of welfare eﬀects of inﬂation; Ragot (2011)
studies the joint distribution of money and ﬁnancial assets.
3which to analyze ﬁscal policy. Our paper shows that combining the Baumol-Tobin model with
an incomplete-markets life-cycle economy gives rise, endogenously, to a signiﬁcant presence of
hand-to mouth households. As a result, deviations from Ricardian neutrality, in the short-run,
can be large. Thus, properly designed government transfers and tax cuts can have substantial
immediate impact on the macroeconomy.
Since Campbell and Mankiw (1989), it has been argued that some aspects of the data
are best viewed as generated not by a single forward-looking type of consumer, but rather by
the coexistence of two types of consumers: one forward-looking and consuming its permanent
income (the saver); the other following the “rule of thumb” of consuming its current income (
(the spender; see also Mankiw (2000)). Our model can be seen as a microfoundation for this
view since it endogenously generates ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ households alongside standard
buﬀer-stock consumers.8 A natural question is: why would households optimally choose to
consume all of their earnings every period, instead of withdrawing from their illiquid wealth
and smoothing shocks? The answer is that households are better oﬀ taking this welfare loss
than smoothing consumption because the latter option entails either (i) paying the transaction
cost more often to withdraw cash when needed to smooth shocks, or (ii) holding large balances
of cash and foregoing the high return on the illiquid asset. This explanation is reminiscent
of calculations by Cochrane (1989), and more recently by Browning and Crossley (2001), who
show that the utility loss from setting consumption equal to income, instead of fully optimizing,
is very small.
An important implication of Cochrane’s remark is that small tax rebates may not be a
powerful validating source of data for choosing between competing structural models of con-
sumption behavior. Chetty (2011) makes a similar argument in the context of labor supply
choices. We take this point very seriously and show that a number of additional implications
of the model are consistent with the data: (i) the heterogeneity in consumption responses
8The model by Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) also features ‘wealthy constrained’ agents endogenously, but
through a very diﬀerent mechanism. It assumes that, periodically, households discover they will have a special
consumption need T periods ahead (e.g., education of their kids). This induces them to consume low amounts
until they have saved enough for the special consumption need. During this phase, they may have large MPC
out of unanticipated transitory income. However, in their model the response to the news would also be strong,
and hence rebate coeﬃcients estimated in the micro data as the diﬀerence between households who receive the
check and those who receive the news (e.g., JPS, 2006) would be of negligible magnitude.
4(Misra and Surico, 2011); (ii) the correlation between consumption response and holdings of
liquid wealth (Broda and Parker, 2011); (iii) the size-asymmetry of the responses (Hsieh, 2003);
(iv) their dependence on the aggregate state of the economy (JPS, 2009); (v) the increase in
consumption inequality over the life-cycle (Heathcote et al., 2010).
Our approach to explaining the consumption response to ﬁscal stimulus payments incorpo-
rates ‘frictions’ in asset markets but abstracts from ‘behavioral’ biases. A number of frameworks
(e.g., myopia, hyperbolic discounting, self-control, mental accounting) provide foundations for
the existence of impatient consumers and can hence generate large MPCs, especially out of
windfalls.9 However, without the addition of some form of transaction cost, they cannot gen-
erate small consumption responses to news about future payments. To match the evidence on
anticipated income shocks, models based on information processing costs have been proposed
(e.g., Reis, 2006; Luo, 2008). We cannot exclude a priori that some speciﬁc formulation of
models along these lines might be almost isomorphic to our setup.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 2001 tax rebates and
present the associated empirical evidence on consumption responses. In Section 3, we outline
our model, and present a series of examples from a simpliﬁed version to convey intuition about
how the model works. In Section 4, we describe our parameterization. Section 5 contains the
quantitative analysis of the 2001 rebates and explores several additional implications of the
model. In Section 6, we perform a number of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Measuring the consumption response to tax rebates
Direct cash transfers from governments to households are a commonly used policy tool for
stimulating consumption in the face of an economic downturn. In the 2007-09 recession, for
example, the government resorted twice to this type of intervention.10 In this paper, we focus
our attention on the tax rebate episode of 2001 for two reasons. First, the 2001 tax rebates
9Applications to consumption behavior include, among others, Laibson (1998), Angeletos et al. (2001), and
Thaler (1990).
10The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 provided most households with payments of $300-$600 per adult, and
$300 per child, for a total outlay of $79 billion. The average payment per household was close to $1,000. The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 contained a refundable tax credit of up to $400 per adult,
for a total outlay of $60 billion.
5are the most extensively studied, and the ones for which we have the richest set of empirical
evidence on household consumption responses. Second, we are able to obtain data from the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) about households’ balance sheets in 2001. As we discuss
in Section 4, this is a crucial input into our analysis, and such data does not yet exist for the
period surrounding the latest recession.
The 2001 tax reform The tax rebate of 2001 was part of a broader tax reform, the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA), enacted in May 2001 by
Congress. The reform decreased federal personal income tax rates at all income brackets,
including a reduction in the tax rate on the ﬁrst $12,000 of earnings for a married couple ﬁling
jointly ($6,000 for singles) from 15% to 10%. The majority of these changes were phased in
gradually over the ﬁve years 2002-2006. According to the bill passed in Congress, the entire
Act would “sunset” in 2011. Instead the bill was ultimately renewed in December 2010 for a
further two years.
The tax rebate The reduction from 15% to 10% for the lowest bracket was deemed
eﬀective in January 2001 and meant that a tax refund would be received by households only in
April 2002. In order to make this item of the reform highly visible during calendar year 2001,
the Administration decided to pay an advance refund (informally called a tax rebate). The
Treasury calculated that 92 million taxpayers received a rebate check, with 72 million receiving
the maximum amount, ($600, or 5% of $12,000, for married couples). Overall, the payments
amounted to $38B, i.e., just below 0.4% of 2001 GDP. The vast majority of the checks were
mailed between the end of July and the end of September 2001, in a sequence based on the last
two digits of social security number (SSN). This sequence featured in the news in June. At the
same time, the Treasury mailed every taxpayer a letter informing them which week they would
receive their check.
From the point of view of economic theory, the tax rebate of 2001 has three salient charac-
teristics: (i) it is essentially a lump-sum, since almost every household received $300 per adult;
(ii) it is anticipated, at least for that part of the population which received the check later
and that, presumably, had enough time to learn about the rebate either from the news, from
the Treasury letter, or from friends/family who had already received it; and (iii) the timing of
6receipt of the rebate has the feature of a randomized experiment because the last two digits of
SSN are uncorrelated with any individual characteristics. Whether the rebate was perceived
as permanent or transitory is less clear: ﬁrst, it depends on what beliefs households held with
respect to the sunset; second, the rebate was more generous than its long-run counterpart in
the tax reform: according to Kiefer et al. (2002), the tax reform reduced the eﬀective marginal
tax rate below $12,000 by 3.3 percent, or $390. As a result, there was a sizeable transitory
component in the rebate (approximately 1/3).
Empirical evidence JPS (2006) use questions added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) that ask about the timing and the amount of the rebate check. Among the various






1Xi,t−1 + β2Rit + εit (1)
where ∆cit is the change in nondurable expenditures of household i in quarter t, months is a
time dummy, Xi,t−1 is a vector of demographics, and Rit is the dollar value of the rebate received
by household i in quarter t. The coeﬃcient β2, which we label the ‘rebate coeﬃcient’, is the
object of interest. Identiﬁcation comes from randomization in the timing of the receipt of rebate
checks across households. However, since the size of the rebate is potentially endogenous, JPS
(2006) estimate equation (1) by 2SLS using an indicator for whether the rebate was received
as instrument. Table 1 reproduces estimates from JPS (2006). Their key ﬁnding is that β2 is
estimated between 0.20 and 0.40, depending on the exact deﬁnition of nondurables.
Since their original inﬂuential estimates, others have reﬁned this empirical analysis. Hamil-
ton (2008) argues that the CEX is notoriously noisy, and one should trim the sample to exclude
outliers. When the top 10 and bottom 10 records are deleted from the sample (of roughly 13,000
observations), the rebate coeﬃcient on nondurables drops to 0.24. Misra and Surico (2011) use
quantile regression techniques to explicitly account for heterogeneity in the consumption re-
sponse across households. Their point estimate is, again, around 0.24 and, more importantly,
the rebate coeﬃcient is much more precisely estimated.11 We conclude that estimates of the
11More precise estimates of the order of 20%-25% are obtained by PSJM (2011) in the context of the 2008
episode. While this additional evidence reinforces the ﬁnding that consumption responses to ﬁscal stimulus
payments are signiﬁcant, since the economic environment and the program design were diﬀerent between 2001
and 2008, one should be cautious in drawing conclusions.
7Table 1: Estimates of the 2001 Rebate Coeﬃcient (ˆ β2)
Strictly Nondurable Nondurable
JPS 2006, 2SLS (N = 13,066) 0.202 (0.112) 0.375 (0.136)
H 2008, 2SLS (N = 12,710) 0.242 (0.106)
MS 2011, IVQR (N = 13,066) 0.244 (0.057)
Notes: Strictly nondurables includes food (at home and away), utilities, household operations, public trans-
portation and gas, personal care, alcohol and tobacco, and miscellaneous goods. Nondurables also includes
apparel good and services, reading materials, and out-of-pocket health care expenditures. JPS 2006: Johnson,
Parker and Souleles (2006); H 2008: Hamilton (2008); MS 2011: Misra and Surico (2011). 2SLS: Two-Stage
Least Squares; IVQR: Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression.
rebate coeﬃcient range between 0.20 and 0.40, with the most recent estimates putting more
weight towards the lower bound.
It is crucial to understand exactly the meaning of the rebate coeﬃcient β2. Because house-
holds who do not receive the check at date t (the control group) may know they will receive
it in the future, β2 should be interpreted as the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out
of the rebate, net of the consumption response for households in the control group which, in
general, is not zero. As a result β2 is not a MPC out of the rebate, a point on which the ex-
isting literature is somewhat fuzzy. This qualiﬁcation has two consequences. First, to be able
to generate a large value for β2, a model must feature a large MPC out of transitory shocks
- but this is a necessary condition, not a suﬃcient one. The model must also feature a low
MPC out of the news of the shock. In the absence of this second requirement, ˆ β2 would become
small since it would be the diﬀerence between two equally large numbers. As argued in the
Introduction, this observation is useful in distinguishing among competing theories. Second,
since ˆ β2 is not a MPC, it cannot be used to draw inference on the impact of the policy on
aggregate consumption. We return to this point in Section 5.3.
3 A life-cycle model with liquid and illiquid assets
We now describe our framework. The model integrates the Baumol-Tobin inventory-management
model of money demand into an incomplete-markets life-cycle economy. In this section we
outline the model in steady-state. We use a series of examples to highlight the economic mech-
8anisms at work. Then, in Section 4, we introduce two additional features needed to model the
rebate experiment: tax reform and recession.
3.1 Model description
Demographics The stationary economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed
by i. Age is indexed by j = 1,2,...,J. Households retire at age Jw and retirement lasts for Jr
periods.









, γ ≥ 1 (2)
where cij is consumption of nondurables for household i at age j.
Idiosyncratic earnings In any period during the working years, household labor earnings
(in logs) are given by
logyij = χj + αi + ψij + zij, (3)
where χj is a deterministic age proﬁle common across all households; αi is a household-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀect; ψi is the slope of a household-speciﬁc deterministic linear age-earnings proﬁle; and
zij is a stochastic idiosyncratic component that follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process Γz
j (zj+1,zj).
Financial assets There are two assets: a liquid asset mij (‘cash’), and an illiquid asset
aij. The illiquid asset pays a gross return Ra = 1/qa, while positive balances of the liquid
asset pay a gross return Rm = 1/qm. We assume that Ra > Rm and note that, since these
are real returns, they could be below one. When the household wants to make deposits into,
or withdrawals from, the illiquid account, she must pay a transaction cost κ.12 This creates a
meaningful trade-oﬀ between holding the two assets. Households start their working lives with
an exogenously given quantity of each asset.
Illiquid assets are restricted to be non-negative, aij ≥ 0, but we allow borrowing in the liquid
asset to reﬂect the availability of credit up to a limit, m. The interest rate on borrowing is
12It is straightforward to allow for a utility cost or a time cost (proportional to labor income) rather than a
monetary cost of adjustment. We have experimented with both types of costs and obtained similar results in
both cases. We return to this point in Section 6.
9denoted by 1/¯ qm and we deﬁne the function qm (mi,j+1) to encompass both the case mi,j+1 ≥ 0
and mi,j+1 < 0.
Government Government expenditures G are not valued by households. Retirees receive
social security beneﬁts p(χJw,αi,ψi,ziJw) where the arguments proxy for average gross lifetime
earnings. The government levies proportional taxes on consumption expenditures (τc) and on
asset income (τa,τm), a payroll tax τss (yij) with an earnings cap, and a progressive tax on
labor income τy (yij). The combined income tax liability function is:
T (yij,aij,mij) = [τ
y (yij) + τ




m)mij · 1mij>0 (4)
where the indicator function means that there is no deduction for interest paid on unsecured
borrowing. For retirees, the same tax function applies with p(χJw,αi,ψi,ziJw) in place of yij.
Finally, we let the government issue one-period debt B at price qg.
Household problem We use a recursive formulation of the problem. Let sj = (mj,aj,α,ψ,zj)
be the vector of individual states at age j. The value function of a household at age j is






, where V 0
j (sj) and V 1
j (sj) are the value functions conditional
on not adjusting and adjusting (i.e., depositing into or withdrawing from) the illiquid account,
respectively. This decision takes place at the beginning of the period, after receiving the current
endowment shock, but before consuming.13
Consider a working household with j ≤ Jw. If the household chooses not to adjust its
13The timing of the earnings shock and adjustment decisions implies that our model does not feature a cash-
in-advance (CIA) constraint. In models with a CIA constraint, during a period of given length the household
is unable to use a certain fraction (typically all) of his current income to ﬁnance purchases during that same
period. In our model, after the earnings shock, the household can always choose to pay the transaction cost,
withdraw from the illiquid account, and use all its income to ﬁnance consumption. Put diﬀerently, the period
length for which some of the income of the agent is tied in the illiquid asset and unavailable for consumption
expenditure is entirely under the agent’s control. Our model would feature a CIA constraint only if, within the
period, the transaction cost was inﬁnite. See Jovanovic (1982) for an exhaustive discussion of the diﬀerence
between models with transaction costs and models with CIA constraints.
10illiquid assets because V 0
j (sj) ≥ V 1
j (sj), it solves the dynamic problem:
V
0
j (sj) = max
cj,mj+1




j (mj+1)mj+1 + (1 + τ




yj = exp(χj + α + ψj + zj)
If the household chooses to adjust its holding of illiquid assets because V 0





j (sj) = max
cj,mj+1,aj+1




j (mj+1)mj+1 + q
aaj+1 + (1 + τ
c)cj = yj − T (yj,aj,mj) + mj + aj − κ
aj+1 ≥ 0
mj+1 ≥ m
yj = exp(χj + α + ψj + zj)
The problem for the retired household of age j > Jw is similar, with beneﬁts p(χJw,αi,ψi,ziJw)
in place of earnings yj.
Equilibrium The returns on the two assets are exogenous. Given qa and qm (m), house-




















is balanced, where µj is the distribution of households of age j over sj.












(a) Lifecycle asset accumulation










Consumption (1 asset, high R)
Consumption (1 asset, low R)
Consumption (2 assets)
(b) Lifecycle income and consumption path
Figure 1: Example of lifecycle in the two-asset model
3.2 Behavior in the model: “wealthy hand-to-mouth” households
Two Euler equations Consumption and portfolio decisions are characterized by a ‘short-
run’ Euler equation (EE-SR) that corresponds to (dis)saving in the liquid asset, and a ‘long-run’
Euler equation that corresponds to (dis)saving in the illiquid asset (EE-LR). To understand,
consider a deterministic version of the model without income risk, borrowing, and taxes.






The slope of her consumption path is governed by β/qm which, for plausible parameterizations,
is below one. Hence consumption declines over time because of impatience and the low return
on cash. A constrained household consumes all her earnings, i.e., cj = yj.
During the working life, the agent saves to ﬁnance retirement by making periodic deposits
into the illiquid account. Given the ﬁxed cost of adjusting, households accumulate liquid assets
and choose dates at which to deposit some or all of their liquid holdings into the illiquid account
(the ‘cake-baking’ problem). Across two such adjustment dates N periods apart, consumption









Since β/qa > β/qm, consumption grows more (or falls less) across adjustment dates, than in
12between adjustments.
During retirement, the household faces a ‘cake-eating’ problem, where optimal decisions
closely resemble those in Romer (1986). Consumption in excess of pension income is ﬁnanced by
making periodic withdrawals from the illiquid account. Between each withdrawal, the household
runs down its liquid holdings and consumption falls according to (EE-SR). The withdrawals
are timed to coincide with the period where cash is exhausted. Across withdrawals, equation
(EE-LR) holds.14
Figure 1 shows consumption and wealth dynamics in an example where an agent with
logarithmic utility starts her working life with zero wealth, receives a constant endowment
while working and a lower endowment when retired.15 Panel (a) shows that the agent in this
example chooses to adjust his illiquid account at only three points in time: one deposit while
working, and two withdrawals in retirement. In between, the value of the illiquid account grows
at rate 1/qa. Panel (b) shows her associated income and consumption paths. In the same panel,
we have also plotted the paths for consumption arising in the two versions of the corresponding
one-asset model: one with the ‘short-run’ interest rate 1/qm, and one with the ‘long-run’ rate
1/qa. The sawed pattern for consumption that arises in the two-asset model is a combination
of the short-run and long-run behavior: between adjustment dates the consumption path is
parallel to the path in the one-asset model with the low return; while across consumption
dates, the slope is parallel to consumption in the one-asset model with the high return. Finally
note that, under this parameterization, the young agent is constrained for the initial phase of
her working life, when her net worth is zero.
Endogenous ‘hand-to-mouth’ behavior Figure 2 illustrates how the model can fea-
ture households with positive net worth who consume their income every period: the “wealthy
hand-to-mouth” agents. The parameterization is the same as in Figure 1, except for a higher
return on the illiquid asset Ra. This higher return leads to stronger overall wealth accumula-
tion. Importantly, rather than increasing the number of deposits during the working life, the
household changes the timing of its single deposit. The single deposit into the illiquid account
14In this example, our problem during retirement with no discounting, log utility, and the transaction cost
expressed in utility terms would coincide with Romer (1986) and withdrawal dates would be equidistant, subject
to the ‘integer problem’ intrinsic in the discrete-time formulation.
15To make this example as stark as possible, we impose a very large transaction cost.












(a) Lifecycle asset accumulation











(b) Lifecycle income and consumption path
Figure 2: Example of lifecycle of a ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ agent in the two-asset model
is now made earlier in life in order to take advantage of the high return for a longer period
(compare the left panels across Figures 1 and 2). Thus, instead of being constrained at the
beginning of the life cycle, the household optimally chooses to hold zero liquid assets in the
middle of the working life, after its deposit, while the illiquid asset holdings are positive and are
growing in value. Intuitively, since her net worth is large, this household would like to consume
more than her earnings ﬂow, but the transaction cost dissuades her from doing it. This is a
household that, upon receiving the rebate, will consume a large part of it and, upon the news
of the rebate, cannot increase her expenditures without making a costly withdrawal from her
illiquid account.16
Why would households choose to consume all of their earnings every period and deviate
from the optimal consumption path imposed by the short-run Euler equation EE-SR, even for
long periods of time? The answer is that households are better oﬀ taking this welfare loss
than smoothing consumption because the latter option entails either (i) paying the transaction
cost more often to withdraw cash when needed to smooth shocks; or (ii) accumulating more
liquid wealth for precautionary reasons hence foregoing the high return on the illiquid asset
(and, therefore, the associated higher level of consumption). This observation is reminiscent of
16As discussed in the Introduction, the model by Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) also features ‘wealthy
constrained’ agents. However, their mechanism is diﬀerent and, even though it is consistent with high MPC out
of transitory shocks, would not be capable of generating large MPC out of anticipated income changes or large
rebate coeﬃcients.
14Cochrane’s (1989) insight that, in a representative agent model with reasonable risk aversion,
the utility loss from setting consumption equal to income is very small.17
4 Calibration
We now present a calibration of the model without credit (m = 0) and without heterogenous
earnings slopes (ψi = 0). In Section 6 we analyze these extensions of the model.
Demographics and preferences Decisions in the model take place at a quarterly fre-
quency. Households begin their active economic life at age 22 (j = 1) and retire at age 60
(Jw = 152). The retirement phase lasts for 20 years (Jr = 80). We assume a unitary intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (γ = 1) and we calibrate the discount factor β to replicate median
illiquid wealth in the SCF (see below).18
Earnings heterogeneity We estimate the parameters of the earnings process (common
life-cycle proﬁle, initial variance of earnings, and variance of earnings shocks) through a mini-
mum distance algorithm that targets the empirical covariance structure of household earnings
constructed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Speciﬁcally, from the PSID we
select a sample of households with heads 22-59 years old in 1969-1996, following the same crite-
ria as in Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010). We construct the empirical mean age-earnings
proﬁle and covariance functions in levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences, exploiting the longitudinal di-
mension of the data. We simulate the process in (3) at a quarterly frequency, also allowing for
an i.i.d. shock, and aggregate quarterly earnings into annual earnings. From the implied annual
earnings we construct the model counterpart of the empirical moments and minimize the dis-
tance between the two set of moments. We interpret the transitory component as measurement
17See also Browning and Crossley (2001) for a similar calculation in the context of the life-cycle model of
consumption.
18In the literature on quantitative macroeconomic models with heterogeneous households and incomplete
markets there are two approaches to calibrating the discount factor. The ﬁrst is to match median wealth (e.g.,
Carroll, 1992, 1997). The second is to match aggregate wealth (e.g., Aiyagari, 1994; Rios-Rull, 1995; Krusell
and Smith, 1998). There is a trade oﬀ in this choice. Matching median wealth allows one to reproduce more
closely the wealth distribution, with the exception of the upper tail. Matching mean wealth allows one to fully
incorporate equilibrium eﬀects on prices, at the cost of overstating wealth holdings and, therefore, understating
the MPC for a large fraction of households (due to the concavity of the consumption function, see Carroll and
Kimball, 1996). Since, for the question at hand, matching the liquid and illiquid wealth holdings of households,
as well as their MPC, the bottom half of the distribution is far more important than price eﬀects, here we
choose the former approach.
15error in earnings and hence, in simulations, we abstract from it.
Households’ portfolio data Our data source is the 2001 wave of the SCF, a triennial cross-
sectional survey of the assets and debts of US households. For comparability with the CEX
sample in JPS (2006), we exclude the top 5% of households by net worth. Average labor income
for the bottom 95% is $52,696, a number close to the one reported by JPS (2006, Table 1).19
Our deﬁnition of liquid assets comprises: money market, checking, savings and call accounts
plus directly held mutual funds, stocks, bonds, and T-Bills net of revolving debt on credit card
balances.20 All other wealth, with the exception of equity held in private businesses, is included
in our measure of illiquid assets. It comprises housing net of mortgages and home equity loans,
vehicles net of installment loans, retirement accounts (e.g., IRA, 401K), life insurance policies,
CDs, and saving bonds. Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics.
The data provide overwhelming evidence that the majority of household wealth is held in
(what we call) illiquid assets. For example, the median and mean of the liquid asset distribution
are $2,700, and $30,531, compared with $70,000, and $133,932 for the illiquid asset distribution.
Figure 3(a) shows the evolution of illiquid and liquid wealth over the lifecycle. It is clear
that the bulk of the life-cycle saving over the working life takes place in illiquid wealth, whereas
liquid wealth is fairly constant.
Measuring hand-to-mouth households in the SCF An implication of these low hold-
ings of liquid wealth is that a number of households are likely to be hand-to-mouth, i.e., they
hold liquid assets only because earnings are paid as cash and because of a mismatch in the
timing of consumption and earnings within a pay period, not because they save across peri-
ods. To measure the fraction of these hand-to-mouth households, one must take a stand on
the frequency of pay dates. If households are surveyed at the midpoint of a pay-period, and if
19In our deﬁnition of household labor income, we included unemployment and disability insurance, TANF,
and child beneﬁts.
20The SCF asks the following questions about credit card balances: (i) “How often do you pay on your
credit card balance in full?” Possible answers are: (a) Always or almost always; (b) Sometimes; or (c) Almost
never. (ii) “After the last payment, roughly what was the balance still owed on these accounts?” From the
ﬁrst question, we identify households with revolving debt as those who respond (b) Sometimes or (c) Almost
Never. We then use the answer to the second question, for these households only, to compute statistics about
credit card debt. This strategy (common in the literature, e.g., see Telyukova, 2011) avoids including, as debt,
purchases made through credit cards in between regular payments.
16Table 2: Household Portfolio Composition
Median Mean Fraction After-Tax
($2001) ($2001) Positive Real Return (%)
Earnings plus beneﬁts (age 22-59) 41,000 52,696 – –
Net worth 77,100 164,463 0.95 5.5
Net liquid wealth 2,700 30,531 0.77 -1.1
Cash, checking, saving, MM accounts 1,880 12,026 0.87 -2.0
Directly held MF, stocks, bonds, T-Bills 0 19,920 0.28 4.1
Revolving credit card debt 0 1,415 0.33 –
Net illiquid wealth 70,000 133,932 0.93 6.2
Housing net of mortgages 31,000 72,585 0.68 7.1
Vehicles net of installment loans 11,000 14,562 0.86 5.8
Retirement accounts 950 34,431 0.53 4.5×1.35∗
Life insurance 0 7,734 0.27 0.5
Certiﬁcates of deposit 0 3,805 0.14 1.3
Saving bonds 0 815 0.17 0.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
∗The return on retirement assets is multiplied by a factor of 1.35 to account for the employer
contribution. See the main text for details
expenditures are at constant rate between pay dates, then an estimate of hand-to-mouth house-
holds is the fraction of households with wealth less than half of their earnings per pay-period.
Figure 3(b) provides an estimate of the number of such households, using two alternative def-
initions of wealth: net worth, which is the relevant deﬁnition for comparison with one asset
models; and liquid wealth, which is the relevant deﬁnition for comparison with our two asset
model. For each, we report three lines, corresponding to three alternative assumptions on the
frequency of payment: weekly, biweekly, and monthly.21
Based on net worth, between 5.6% and 7.1% of households aged 22-79 are hand-to-mouth,
while based on liquid wealth between 30% and 42% are hand-to-mouth. The grey area in
between the two solid lines (which refers to biweekly payments) is composed of households
21If one is unwilling to make the assumption that households are surveyed half-way through their pay period,
then identifying who is constrained requires additional information. For example, under the assumption that
households are surveyed uniformly during pay-periods, to compute the fraction of constrained agents one must
know exactly when a household is paid relative to the survey date, and the balance on their account at the last
pay date.





























(a) Median liquid and illiquid wealth (SCF)

































Constrained in terms of net worth
Constrained in terms of liquid wealth
(b) Hand-to-mouth households (SCF): – monthly
pay; - biweekly pay; -. weekly pay
Figure 3: Liquid and illiquid wealth over the life-cycle in the data (2001 SCF)
who have positive illiquid wealth but do not carry positive balances of liquid assets between
pay periods. These are the empirical counterpart of the ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ agents in
our model. Note that this last group of households, which represents a sizeable fraction of the
population (between 24% and 35%), is only visible through the lenses of the two-asset model.
From the point of view of the standard one asset model, these are households with positive net
worth, hence unconstrained.
These ﬁndings are consistent with recent survey evidence in Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano
(2011) showing that almost one third of US households would “certainly be unable to cope
with a ﬁnancial emergency that required them to come up with $2,000 in the next month.”
The authors also report that, among those giving that answer, a high proportion of individuals
are at middle class levels of income. Similarly, Broda and Parker (2011) document, from the
AC Nielsen Homescan database, that almost 40% of households report that they do not have
“at least two months of income available in cash, bank accounts, or easily accessible funds ”.
Asset returns To measure returns on the various asset classes, we focus on the period 1960-
2009. All of the following returns are expressed in annual nominal terms. We set the nominal
return on checking accounts to zero and the return on savings accounts, T-Bills and savings
bonds to the interest rate on 3-month T-Bills, which was 5.3% over this period (FRB database).
For equities, we use Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted returns,
18assuming dividends are reinvested, and obtain an annualized nominal return of 11.1%.22 The
SCF reports the equity share for directly held mutual funds, stocks and bonds and for retirement
accounts, which allows us to apply separate returns on the equity and bond components of each
saving instrument. An important incentive to save in retirement accounts is the employer’s
matching rate. Over 70% of households in our sample with positive balance on their retirement
account have employer-run retirement plans. The literature on this topic ﬁnds that, typically,
employers match 50% of employees’ contributions up to 6% of earnings, but the vast majority
of employees do not contribute above this threshold (e.g., Papke and Poterba, 1995). As a
result, we raise the return on retirement accounts by a factor of 1.35.23
For housing, we follow Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Niewerburgh (2010). We measure
housing wealth for the household sector from the Flow of Funds, and housing consumption
from the National Income and Products Accounts. The return for year t is constructed as
housing wealth in the fourth quarter of year t plus housing consumption over the year minus
expenses in maintenance and repair divided by housing wealth in the fourth quarter of year
t − 1.24 We subtract population growth in order to correct for the growth in housing quantity.
We also subtract the average property tax, 1% (Tax Foundation, 2011). As a result, we obtain
an average annual nominal return of 13.2%.25
Given the absence of data on the service ﬂow from vehicles (autos, trucks and motorcycles),
we adopt a user cost approach to calculate the return on vehicles. The sum of the interest rate
on T-Bills plus the rate of economic and physical depreciation (available from the BEA) yields
an annual nominal return of 11.6%. For saving bonds and life insurance (assuming actuarially
fair contracts for the latter) we use the return on T-Bills, and for CDs we obtain a nominal
return of 6.3% (FRB database).
22After inﬂation (4.1% over this period), the real return is 7%. Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Niewerburgh
(2010, Table 5), whose calculations we follow, report returns between 7.9% (1953-2008) and 6.6% (1972-2008).
23Since we do not model explicitly the tax-deferred treatment of retirement accounts, we somewhat underes-
timate the eﬀective return on this saving vehicle. See Huntley and Michelangeli (2011).
24Our estimate of expenses in improvement and repair is based on a comprehensive study on housing compiled
by the Joint Center for Housing Studies (2011). Figure 2 reports that these expenses amount to roughly 40%
of total residential investment expenditures.
25After inﬂation, the real return is 9.1%. Favilukis et al. (2010, Table 5) report returns between 9.8% (1953-
2008) and 9.9% (1972-2008). They also report a housing return of 9.1% (1972-2008) computed based on the
repeat-sale Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price index for purchases only (Freddie Mac) and on
the rental price index for shelter (BLS).
19We apply these nominal returns to each household portfolio in the SCF and compute average
returns in the population. The implied average nominal return on illiquid wealth is 12.1% and
on liquid wealth is 3.8%. Finally, we set the annual inﬂation rate to 4.0 percent (the average
over this period is 4.1). After inﬂation and taxes (see below), the after-tax real returns on
liquid and illiquid wealth are 6.2% and -1.1%, respectively. The ﬁnal after-tax real returns on
liquid and illiquid wealth by category are reported in Table 2.
Initial asset positions We use observed wealth portfolios of SCF households aged 20 to
24 to calibrate the age j = 0 initial conditions for assets in the model. We divide this group
into ﬁfteen sub-groups based on their earnings and calculate 1) the fraction with zero holdings,
and 2) the median liquid wealth, illiquid wealth, and net worth in each sub-group, conditional
on positive holdings. When we simulate life-cycles in the model, we create the same sub-groups
based on the initial earnings draw. Within each sub-group, we initialize a fraction of agents
with zero assets, and the rest with the corresponding median holdings of liquid and illiquid
wealth.
Government We set τss (y) to 12.4% up to an earnings cap in order to reproduce the
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax rates in 2000. To compute social
security beneﬁts, individual average lifetime earnings YiJw are run through a formula based
on replacement rates and bend points as in the actual system in the year 2000. The eﬀective
consumption tax rate τc is set to 7.2% (McDaniel, 2007). The function τy (y) is a smooth
approximation to the estimates in Kiefer et al. (2002, Table 5) who report eﬀective tax rates
on wage income for ten income brackets in the year 2000. Kiefer et al. (2002, Table 5) also
report the eﬀective tax schedule on interests and dividends, and on long term capital gains
by ten income brackets in 2000. We apply these tax rates on each household portfolio in our
sample and derive an average eﬀective tax of 22.9% on income from liquid assets (τm), and
of 15.9% on income from illiquid assets (τa).26 When we set government expenditure G to its
value in the year 2000 (using ‘Wages and Salaries Disbursements’ for the year 2000 in NIPA
Table 2.1 as a metric), residual public debt from the government budget constraint is close to
its observed value.
26We apply the interest/dividend tax rates on all assets except for housing and for the equity component of
retirement accounts, on which we apply the capital gain tax rates.
204.1 Modelling the 2001 tax rebate, tax reform, and recession
Tax rebate We assume that the economy is in steady state in 2001:Q1. The rebate checks
are then randomly sent out to half the eligible population in 2001:Q2, and to the other half
in 2001:Q3. We set the rebate size to $500 based on JPS (2006) who report that the average
rebate check was $480 per household.
There are diﬀerent views that one could plausibly take about the timing of when the rebate
enters households’ information sets. At one extreme, households become fully aware of the
rebate when the bill is discussed in Congress and enacted. This scenario implies the news
arriving in 2001:Q1. Under this timing, the check is fully anticipated by both groups. At
the other extreme, one could assume that households became aware of the rebate only after
receiving their own check: under this assumption, both groups of households treat the rebate
as a surprise. In our baseline, we take an intermediate position, i.e., all households learn about
the rebate when the ﬁrst set of Treasury checks are received, in 2001:Q2. Under this timing,
the check was fully anticipated only by the second group who received the check in 2001:Q3.
We explore the two alternative timing assumptions in Section 6. We assume throughout that
the news/check reaches households before the consumption/saving and adjustment decisions
for that quarter.
Tax reform The 2001 rebate was part of a broader tax reform which, beyond decreasing the
lowest rate, also reduced all other marginal rates by roughly 3% or more. We construct the
sequence of eﬀective tax schedules based on Kiefer et al. (2002).27 Most of these changes were
planned to be phased in gradually over the ﬁve years 2002:Q1-2006:Q1 and to ‘sunset’ in 2011.
It turned out that instead of sunsetting, the tax cuts were further extended. We consider two
scenarios regarding the ‘sunset’ clause: (i) households believe that the tax system will revert to
its pre-reform state at the end of ten years; and (ii) households act as if the change in the tax
system is permanent after the reform is fully phased in. A tax reform is deﬁned as a sequence
of tax schedules {Tt}
t∗∗
t=t∗ which is announced, jointly with the rebate, in 2001:Q2. Date t∗, the
ﬁrst quarter of the change in the tax code, is 2002:Q1. Date t∗∗, the last quarter of the change
27Kiefer et al. (2002, Table 5) report the pre and post reform income tax rates, and describe the timing of
the reduction in the various brackets (page 90).
21in the tax code, is 2006:Q1 in absence of sunset, and 2011:Q1 when the tax reform sunsets as
originally legislated.
Recession To model the downturn of 2001, we assume that in 2001:Q2 households become
aware that they are entering a recession. At this time they learn that their labor income will
fall linearly for the next three quarters, generating a cumulative drop of 1.5%, and will then
fully recover over the following eight quarters.28
Transition In 2001:Q2 the economy begins undergoing transitional dynamics. We start by
assuming that the government ﬁnances the rebate program by increasing debt for ten years, and
then repays the rebate outlays and the accumulated interest on the new debt by introducing a
permanent proportional tax on earnings. In our benchmark calibration, the required additional
tax rate is around 0.05%.29
5 Quantitative analysis of the 2001 tax rebate
We start by studying a baseline economy where the tax rebate occurs in isolation. Next, we
incorporate the tax reform and recession. We analyze the model economy for values of the
transaction cost κ ranging from zero to $3,000. The case κ = 0 corresponds to the standard
one-asset model. At κ = 0, we set β to reproduce median net worth, and we set the interest
rate to the average return on net worth in the SCF data (see Table 2).30 For each value of
κ > 0, we re-calibrate β to match median holdings of illiquid wealth.31
Baseline results To ﬁx ideas, it is useful to start from the one-asset economy with κ = 0.
When we compute the rebate coeﬃcient exactly as in JPS (2006) –i.e., we run regression (1)
on simulated panel data– the estimated rebate coeﬃcient is only 1.8%. The vast majority of
28The NBER dates the 2001 recession as starting in March 2001 and ending in November 2001. The magnitude
of the downturn and the duration of its recovery are calibrated from the ‘Wages and Salaries Disbursments’
series in NIPA Table 2.1.
29We experimented by shortening the phase during which the government uses debt up to one year and found
nearly identical results. There are two reasons. First, the ﬁnancing scheme aﬀects equally the treatment and
the control group. Second, the behavior of constrained households is unaﬀected by future rises in taxes.
30This latter choice has no bearing on the ﬁndings since the discount factor is always calibrated to generate
the same amount of net worth. When we set the interest rate to the calibrated value of Rm or Ra, we found
virtually identical results.
31The annualized values of β range between 0.950 and 0.956. Hence, our results are not driven by implausibly
low discount factors which make households highly impatient.
22households in this model hold enough net worth to save the bulk of the rebate, upon its receipt.
Moreover, the response to the news and to the check itself are virtually identical for this group,
as predicted by standard consumption theory. The action comes entirely from the constrained
agents, most of which are very young (below age 35): those in the treatment group have a
high MPC, while those in the control group do not respond at all. In our calibration, only 3
% of households have zero net worth and are hand-to-mouth, which explains the small rebate
coeﬃcient.32
We now move to the two-asset model with κ > 0. Figure 4(a) shows that the fraction of
households adjusting (i.e., accessing the illiquid account to withdraw or deposit) falls with the
size of the transaction cost κ. As illustrated in the simulations of Section 3, retirees adjust
more often than working-age households because they ﬁnance their consumption largely by
withdrawing from the illiquid account. Holdings of liquid wealth increase with the transaction
cost (Figure 4(b)), because when κ is larger households deposit into/withdraw from the illiquid
account less often and carry larger balances of liquid assets. However, even for large transaction
costs, median liquid wealth remains small, around $1,500.33
A corollary of the skewed liquid wealth distribution in Figure 4(b) is that a substantial
fraction of agents do not carry any balances of liquid assets across periods (i.e., do not use cash
to save). In the model, there are two types of such agents. Some agents have zero liquid assets
at the end of the period because they just made a deposit or they will make a withdrawal next
period. Others have zero liquid assets at the end of the period because they are hand-to-mouth
and consume their earnings every period. Figure 4(c) plots the fraction of households in the
latter group, the hand-to-mouth consumers, and divides them into those who also have zero
illiquid wealth and those with positive illiquid wealth. The size of both groups is increasing in κ.
32As reported in Figure 3(b), in the 2001 SCF data this fraction is around 6%. Hence, even though the model
at κ = 0 slightly underestimates this fraction, there is essentially no scope for the one asset model to generate
signiﬁcant rebate coeﬃcients, while remaining consistent with SCF data on the distribution of net worth.
33One may be surprised that optimal holdings of liquid wealth are so small, given the presence of plausibly
calibrated earnings risk. However, with highly persistent shocks, there is little incentive to hold liquid wealth
for precautionary reasons, a well known result in the literature. This is for two reasons. First, the opportunity
cost of holding cash is very high, since Ra is large. Second, households can always withdraw (at a cost) from
the illiquid account in the event of a large negative shock. This view of earnings risk is consistent with the
observed distribution of liquid wealth holdings: had we allowed for a large transitory earnings component, house-
holds would hold counterfactually high quantities of liquid assets, and, accordingly, would have low marginal
propensities to consume out of the rebate.

































(a) Fraction of households adjusting

























































(b) Distribution of liquid wealth










Hand−to−mouth, no illiquid wealth
Hand−to−mouth, positive illiquid wealth
(c) Fraction of hand-to-mouth households

















(d) Mean length of hand-to-mouth spells
Figure 4: Features of two-asset model, by transaction cost
As shown in Figure 4(d), the average length of spells in which hand-to-mouth households hold
zero liquid assets and consume their income is also growing with the level of the transaction
cost. Intuitively, a large value for κ makes it less likely that the household will withdraw from
the illiquid account to smooth large negative earnings shocks.
In what follows, we often focus on the range $500-$1,000 for the transaction cost: in this
range, (i) the fraction of households that adjust each quarter is 15%-20% (4%-8% among workers
and 35%-45% among retirees); (ii) median holdings of liquid wealth are just below their data
counterpart in Table 2; and (iii) the fraction of hand-to mouth consumers is in line with the
empirical estimates of Figure 3.














































































(b) Average marginal propensity to consume
Figure 5: Rebate coeﬃcient and marginal propensity to consume, by transaction cost
Figure 5(a) displays the rebate coeﬃcient in the model for diﬀerent levels of the transaction
cost. The rebate coeﬃcient grows steadily from 1.8% when κ = 0 (the one-asset model) to
21% when κ = $3,000. For transaction costs in the range $500-$1,000, the rebate coeﬃcient
is around 15%, or 8 times higher than its one-asset model counterpart. Figure 5(b) shows the
marginal propensities to consume (MPC) out of the ﬁscal stimulus payment for two groups
of households: those who are hand-to-mouth and those who are not. Note how, for the latter
group, the average MPC is close to zero, while for the former group it is around 45%. Therefore,
most of the households in the model behave exactly as predicted by the PIH and have zero MPC.
The high rebate coeﬃcients are driven by constrained households, and the two-asset model
generates a larger fraction of hand-to-mouth consumers, some of which hold sizeable quantities
of illiquid assets. Such households have signiﬁcant MPC out of the rebate check (when they
are in the treatment group) and do not respond to the news of the check (when they are in
the control group). As a back of the envelope calculation, the 15% rebate coeﬃcient arises as a
weighted average of zero MPC for 2/3 of the population and 45% MPC for the remaining 1/3
in the treatment group. In the control group, both hand-to-mouth and unconstrained agents
have zero MPC.
For low transaction costs, marginal propensities to consume out of moderate income changes
(and hence rebate coeﬃcients) can be negative. When transaction costs are low enough, upon




































Tax reform without sunset
Tax reform with sunset
(a) Rebate coeﬃcient with tax reform



































No tax reform, No recessision
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Tax reform, With recession
(b) Rebate coeﬃcient with recession
Figure 6: Eﬀect of tax reform and recession on rebate coeﬃcient, by transaction cost
receiving the rebate agents may choose to anticipate the adjustment decision and save the
rebate, together with their current holdings of cash, into the illiquid account. As a result,
they save more than the rebate amount (which explains the negative MPC in Figure 5(b)) and
consume less than the control group (which explains the negative rebate coeﬃcient in Figure
5(a)).
Tax reform and recession Figure 6(a) shows that the consumption responses to the tax
rebate are substantially higher when the full tax reform is modeled. On average, the rebate
coeﬃcient increases by 7-8 percentage points. The reason is that the substantial reduction
in future tax liabilities leads to a rise in the desired level of lifetime consumption. Since a
substantial fraction of households (poor and wealthy) are constrained in terms of liquid wealth,
the rebate enables such households to start consuming out of this additional future income
earlier than they would otherwise be able to.34 As is clear from the ﬁgure, our ﬁnding is robust
to whether the sunset clause is implemented or not.
A similar logic applies when we add the recession to the tax rebate experiment. Figure 6(b)
shows that allowing for the fact that the economy was undergoing a recession at the time of
the rebates adds roughly 3 percentage points to the rebate coeﬃcient. Overall, in the range
34When adding the tax reform, the economy with κ = 0 also yields a higher rebate coeﬃcient (see Figure
6(a)), because the eﬀect we describe does apply there as well. However, quantitatively, the additional kick of
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Figure 7: Heterogeneity in rebate coeﬃcients in the model (κ = $750)
$500-$1,000 for κ, the model generates a rebate coeﬃcient between 22% and 29%, in line with
the estimates of Table 1.
5.1 Further implications on consumption responses
Cochrane’s (1989) observation that there may be only small welfare diﬀerences between alter-
native consumption behavior when reacting to small transitory income shocks means that it is
especially useful to investigate additional implications of our model, a point also raised by Card
et al. (2007), and Chetty (2011). Our model has a number of implications about households’
consumption responses that can be compared to the data. We explore: 1) the heterogeneity in
consumption responses across households; 2) their correlation with households’ liquid wealth; 3)
their size-asymmetry; and 4) their state-dependence. When, in order to present more detailed
features of our model, it is necessary to select a speciﬁc value for κ, we choose κ = $750. In the
presence of the tax reform and recession, this value corresponds to a rebate coeﬃcient of 27%.
Heterogeneity Misra and Surico (2011) apply quantile regression techniques to the same
data set as JPS (2006) to study cross-sectional heterogeneity in rebate coeﬃcients. They
conclude that there is a large amount of heterogeneity in consumption responses. There are two
main ﬁndings. First, the distribution of consumption responses is bimodal, with around 40% of
households saving all of the rebate, and another sizeable group of households spending a high
27fraction of the rebate.35 Second, high income households are disproportionately concentrated
in the two tails of the distribution of consumption responses.36 Figure 7 shows that our model
can broadly reproduce these ﬁndings.
Figure 7(a) plots a histogram of rebate coeﬃcients for the working age population, in which
the bimodal nature is stark. The bimodality arises because of the coexistence of a substantial
fraction of (wealthy) hand-to-mouth consumers together with unconstrained agents who fully
save the rebate as predicted by standard theory. Figure 7(b) plots median earnings in each
quantile of the cross-sectional distribution of the consumption responses. The reason why
there are high earnings households at both ends of the distribution is that some of them are
unconstrained and some are wealthy hand-to-mouth. The former are income-rich but their
expected earnings growth is low, the latter are income-rich but their expected earnings proﬁle
is steep, which makes the liquidity constraint more likely to bind. Moreover, because the rebate
is a lump sum, among constrained agents the income-richest have the highest MPC.
Correlation with liquid wealth JPS (2006) estimate rebate coeﬃcients for sub-groups
of households with diﬀerent amounts of liquid assets. They ﬁnd that households in the bottom
half of the distribution have substantially larger consumption responses. These eﬀects are
imprecisely estimated, though, for two reasons. First, the sample becomes very small when
divided into sub-groups. Second, the asset data in the CEX must be viewed with extreme
caution, due to the large amount of item non-response. For example, JPS (2006) have data
on liquid wealth for less than half of the sample, and hence it is likely that respondents are a
highly selected sub-sample. Misra and Surico (2011) also conclude that liquid assets are not
strongly correlated with the size of the consumption response: they identify high liquid wealth
35A complementary source of evidence comes from SS (2003a, 2003b) who added an ad-hoc module to the
Michigan Survey of Consumers to assess the impact of the rebate. This survey asked households what they
would do with their rebate check. 22 percent of respondents said they would mostly spend it, while the rest
said they would mostly save it or repay debt. From these studies, we can infer that the average estimate from
JPS is likely to be the outcome of very high MPC among a relatively small group of households and very
small (or zero) MPC among the majority of the population. PSJM (2011) validate this survey-based ﬁnding by
documenting that CEX households who report that they mostly consumed the 2008 rebate had consumption
responses almost twice as large as those households who report that they mostly saved it.
36This second ﬁnding is not inconsistent with (and could potentially explain) the result reported by JPS
(2006) that, when splitting the population into three income groups, diﬀerences in rebate coeﬃcient across
groups are not statistically signiﬁcant. Similarly, SS (2003a, 2003b) ﬁnd no evidence of higher spending rates
among low income households.





































Figure 8: Rebate coeﬃcients by size of the stimulus payment
households at both ends of the distribution of rebate coeﬃcients.
These results are not inconsistent with our model. In the model, there are some high liquid
wealth households who are not constrained and consume little out of the rebate, and others
(with high income and high expected income growth) who are constrained and have a large
MPC out of the rebate. This feature of the model explains why, empirically, the relationship
between rebate coeﬃcients and the level of liquid wealth is statistically weak.
The model’s sharpest prediction is that households with low liquid wealth to earnings ratios
have larger consumption responses. Broda and Parker (2011) exploit the AC Nielsen Homescan
database, a sample ﬁfty times larger than the CEX, to study the consumption response to the
ﬁscal stimulus payment of 2008. They ask households “In case of an expected decline in income
or increase in expenses, do you have at least two months of income available in cash, bank
accounts, or easily accessible funds?” Hence their liquid wealth variable is relative to earnings.
They split households in two groups and ﬁnd very strong (and statistically signiﬁcant) evidence
that households with a low ratio of liquid assets to income spend at least twice as much as the
average household, precisely as predicted by our model.37
Size asymmetry Hsieh (2003) shows that the same CEX consumers who ‘overreact’ to the
37Souleles (1999) studies the consumption response to anticipated tax refunds (whose median size is around
$560 (Table 1). When the sample is split between low and high liquid wealth-earnings ratio households, the
former group is found to have statistically signiﬁcant larger responses to the refund (Table 4).
292001 tax rebates, respond very weakly to payments received from the Alaskan Permanent Fund.
These payments are, on average, much larger than the rebate we examined (around $2,000 per
household). Browning and Collado (2001) document similar evidence from Spanish survey data:
workers who receive anticipated double-payment bonuses (hence, again, large amounts) in the
months of June and December do not alter their consumption growth signiﬁcantly in those
months. One interpretation of these results is that, although households spend large fractions
of small anticipated shocks, they predominantly save large anticipated shocks.
Figure 8 shows how the propensity to consume the rebate declines when the size of the
rebate is increased above $500, as a function of κ. In the baseline environment with a $750
transaction cost, the rebate coeﬃcient drops by almost a factor of three (from 16% to 6%) as
the size of the stimulus payment increases from $500 to $2,000. A large enough rebate loosens
the liquidity constraint, and even constrained households will ﬁnd it optimal to save a portion
of their payment.38 Moreover, for rebates that are suﬃciently high relative to the transaction
cost, many working households will choose to pay the transaction cost and make a deposit
upon receipt of the rebate. But, since adjusting households are not constrained, they will save
a signiﬁcant fraction of the rebate, as in the one-asset model.
This latter eﬀect may be strong enough to cause the consumption response to fall also in
absolute terms as the rebate size increases, for given transaction cost. Figure 8 shows that, when
the transaction cost is $750, the average consumption expenditure is larger for a $1,000 rebate
than for a $2,000 rebate. This example underscores the relevance for policy of understanding
the structural mechanism that lies behind the empirical evidence.39
State dependence As is clear from Figure 6(b), our model implies that recessions exacer-
bate the consumption response to tax rebates. Since most episodes of ﬁscal stimulus payments
occur in recessions, it is diﬃcult, empirically, to isolate the role of aggregate economic condi-
tions on the size of the consumption response. A unique piece of evidence is oﬀered by JPS
38This occurs if the size of the rebate is larger than the amount by which consumption would increase if the
household were not currently constrained.
39Figure 8(a) shows how estimated rebate coeﬃcient may become negative for large ranges of the transaction
cost, as for the case of a $5,000. As explained earlier, this occurs when the stimulus payment is large relative
to the transaction cost. In this case a substantial fraction of working households choose to make a deposit into
the illiquid account upon receipt of the payment, and hence reduce their consumption in that period relative to
that of the control group.













(a) Mean earnings, consumption and
wealth in one asset model














(b) Mean earnings, consumption and
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(c) Variance log earnings and log con-
sumption in one asset model















(d) Variance log earnings and log
consumption in two asset model
Figure 9: Lifecycle proﬁles (means and variances) in the one-asset and two-asset models
(2009) who examine the impact of the child tax credit of 2003, a period of sustained growth.
Compared to the spending response to the 2001 rebates, their point estimates of the con-
temporaneous response of consumption are about half of those estimated for 2001 in similar
speciﬁcations (although not statistically signiﬁcant). This leads them to conjecture “a more
potent response to such payments in recessions, when liquidity constraints are more likely to
bind, than during times of more typical economic growth.” Our model suggests a mechanism
why this force may be at work and quantiﬁes its signiﬁcance.40
40The state dependence can be quite complex. For example, a suﬃciently sharp recession may induce house-
holds to pay the transaction cost and withdraw from the illiquid account. In such a scenario, rebate coeﬃcients
are likely to be very low. In other words, the size of the recession matters too. We return to this point in the
Conclusions.



















(a) Time path of rebate (dashed line) and consump-
tion expenditures (solid line) for the two groups

















(b) Percentageof total rebate outlays spent on non-
durables by quarter
Figure 10: Aggregate consumption dynamics following the rebate
5.2 Life-cycle implications
Figure 9 compares the life-cycle means and variances of earnings, consumption and net worth
across the one-asset and two-asset models. Both models reproduce reasonably well the key
features of the data (e.g., see Heathcote, Perri and Violante, 2010). The models are hardly
distinguishable along these dimensions. Note, however, that consumption inequality grows
slightly more in the two-asset economy, as households tolerate larger consumption ﬂuctuations
to avoid paying the transaction cost and hold assets in the high-return (illiquid) saving vehicle.
5.3 Aggregate implications of the rebate program
To isolate the impact of the rebate program on the aggregate economy, we study the dynamics
of aggregate consumption relative to a counterfactual economy which has all the features of the
baseline (including recession and tax reform) except for the ﬁscal stimulus payments. Figure
10(a) plots the time path of the rebate distribution and consumption for the two groups. Figure
10(b) shows that the aggregate impact of the policy: 13% and 18% of total rebate outlays are
spent on nondurables, respectively, in the ﬁrst two quarters. The impact, though, is very short
lived: a year after the rebate disbursement diﬀerential consumption growth is essentially zero.
Overall, within the ﬁrst year, the cumulative fraction of the rebate outlays spent on nondurable
32consumption is around 40%.
Since, in our model, we know the counterfactual path of aggregate consumption in the
absence of the rebate (but in the presence of the tax reform and recession), it is possible to
express the impact of the rebate as a percentage increase in aggregate consumption. We ﬁnd
it to be 0.62% and 0.85% in the ﬁrst two quarters, respectively. The cumulative increase in
aggregate consumption over the ﬁrst year is 1.8%.
These calculations highlight two beneﬁts of having a structural model that is consistent
with the micro evidence. First, because the tax reform and the recession aﬀect consumption
even in the absence of the rebate, it is incorrect to measure consumption growth relative to a
baseline of consumption in the period before the rebate announcement. Rather, the full path
of counterfactual consumption should be taken into account. Second, to calculate the total
portion of the rebate that is spent, it is incorrect to multiply the rebate coeﬃcient by the total
size of the rebate (as a fraction of aggregate consumption), as done for example by the CBO
(2009). The reason is that, as explained, the rebate coeﬃcient β2 is not the MPC out of the
rebate, but the diﬀerence between the MPC for those who receive the check and that of the
rest of the population.
6 Robustness
In this Section, we discuss the robustness of our ﬁndings with respect to the timing of arrival of
the news, the speciﬁc process for individual earnings, the speciﬁc form of the transaction cost,
and the availability of consumer credit.
Arrival of news In Figure 11(a), we report the consumption response to the tax rebate
under alternative assumptions about when the news of the rebate enters households’ information
sets. When the rebate is a surprise for everyone, the rebate coeﬃcient increases by around 5
percentage points on average. When it is anticipated by every household (the news arrives one
quarter ahead for the ﬁrst group and two quarters ahead for the second group), the estimated
rebate coeﬃcient drops by a similar amount. However, it still remains of a sizeable magnitude,
between 17% and 25% in the $500-$1,000 range for κ. The reason is that liquidity constrained
households are those driving the results and, for such households, learning that they will receive
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(a) Rebate coeﬃcients under alternative assump-
tions on timing of the arrival of news





































(b) Rebate coeﬃcients under alternative models
for earnings heterogeneity
Figure 11: Robustness analysis with respect to arrival of news and earnings heterogeneity
some income in the near future has little or no impact on their current consumption.41
Earnings heterogeneity In our baseline calibration we took the view that the increase
in earnings dispersion over the life-cycle is the result of the accumulation of highly persis-
tent idiosyncratic shocks. An alternative view, also quite common in the literature (Guvenen,
2009), is that it is the result of heterogeneity in deterministic idiosyncratic earnings proﬁles.
We re-estimated the parameters of our log household earnings process omitting the unit root
component zit and reinstating the household-speciﬁc slope ψi by matching the same set of
cross-sectional moments described in Section 4. The discount factor β is always set to match
median illiquid wealth, as in the baseline. Figure 11(b) compares the rebate coeﬃcients in the
baseline model (without tax reform and recession). The implications of these two models are
very similar, but the heterogenous earnings proﬁle model seems capable of generating slightly
larger rebate coeﬃcients for a wide range of κ.
Transaction cost In the benchmark model, the ﬁxed cost κ is the same across households.
Here we explored two alternative forms of transaction cost: proportional to individual earnings
(i.e., entering the budget constraint as −κyij), and in terms of utility (i.e., entering period
41When the rebate is anticipated by all households, even though the measured rebate coeﬃcient is smaller, the
aggregate cumulative eﬀect on consumption is very similar to the baseline speciﬁcation. This result reinforces
the view that one should be cautious in using the value of the estimated rebate coeﬃcient to draw inference on
aggregate implications for consumption, as we argued in Section 5.3.
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(a) Rebate coeﬃcients under alternative models for the
transaction cost




































Low Rate: wedge = 0.05
High Rate: wedge = 0.30
(b) Rebate coeﬃcients under alternative borrow-
ing rates. The reported wedge is relative to the
return on the liquid asset
Figure 12: Robustness analysis with respect to credit and the form of the transaction cost
utility as log(cij) − κ. Given the log speciﬁcation, the latter speciﬁcation corresponds to a
cost proportional to individual consumption. The key diﬀerence with the baseline is that the
cost is not lump sum, but is larger for high income (or consumption) households. Figure
12(a) reports the rebate coeﬃcients for these two models. Transaction costs of around 6% of
quarterly earnings or consumption yield values for the rebate coeﬃcient around 25%, as in the
benchmark. For the median household whose annual earnings are $41,000 (see Table 2), this
cost corresponds to roughly $600.
Consumer credit A natural conjecture is that the rebate coeﬃcient would be signiﬁcantly
reduced by the existence of credit, if households that are paid the rebate later ﬁnd it worthwhile
to borrow in anticipation of the ﬁscal stimulus payment. Figure 12(b) shows that in the model
this conjecture turns out to be correct only for an intermediate range on borrowing rates.42 For
high enough rates (e.g., “expensive” borrowing through credit cards), borrowing is too costly
and since households are not too impatient they are better oﬀ waiting for the check next quarter
than pre-empting consumption at the cost of large interest payments. For low enough rates
(e.g., “cheap” borrowing through home equity loans), there is an arbitrage opportunity in the
42In all the experiments of Figure 12(b), we have set the individual borrowing limit equal to their current
quarterly earnings, but the results are robust to changes in this parameter.
35model: most households ﬁnd it optimal to borrow up to the limit and save into the high-return
illiquid account.43 As a result, households tend to bunch at two kinks: zero and m. Since even
more households in this version of the model are at a kink, rebate coeﬃcients are larger than
in the baseline (compare the top line of Figure 12(b) with the top line of Figure 6(a)). This
parameterization is instructive because it clearly illustrates that the addition of credit to the
model does not necessarily dampen rebate coeﬃcients. Finally, as explained, for intermediate
interest rates the conjecture goes through and rebate coeﬃcients drop substantially – even
though the ampliﬁcation relative to the one asset model remains strong. Recall that in these
experiments we allow every household to access credit and they can do so at zero transaction
cost. Under costly access to credit, the results would be closer to our benchmark model.
7 Concluding remarks
The objective of this paper was to demonstrate how, by integrating the Baumol-Tobin model
with the standard incomplete-markets life-cycle framework, one can provide a theoretical foun-
dation, and a quantitative validation, for the observation that the MPC out of anticipated
temporary income changes is large – an empirical ﬁnding that is substantiated by robust quasi-
experimental evidence. Going forward, we plan to expand our analysis in several directions.
In using public funds to stimulate consumption, policy makers face a broad array of options,
of which across-the-board tax rebates are only one speciﬁc example. A key beneﬁt of having
a fully structural model is that one can investigate the counterfactual welfare and aggregate
eﬀects of alternative policies. Among the policies that we plan to study are more targeted tax
rebates and temporary reductions in consumption taxes, as was recently implemented in the
UK (see Blundell (2009)).
The model can be used to address the 2008 episode of ﬁscal stimulus payments. Under the
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, households received on average nearly $1,000. PJSM (2011)
and Broda and Parker (2011) estimate rebate coeﬃcients for nondurable expenditures between
half and 2/3 of the size of the 2001 estimates. The 2008 episode diﬀers from the 2001 episode
43According to Greenspan and Kennedy (2008), 2/3 of the net proceeds of home equity loans are used for
home improvements and purchase of durables.
36in three ways. First, its magnitude is roughly twice as large. Second, it is not part of any
broader tax reform. Third, eligibility phases out quickly starting at $75,000 of gross individual
income. Qualitatively, the lack of a tax reform and the larger rebate size suggest that the
model would generate a somewhat lower response in 2008, while the phasing out would induce
a higher response as more of the hand-to-mouth households are among the low-income ones
(although, as discussed in Section 5.1, we expect this eﬀect to be weak). Moreover, the 2008
recession was much deeper than its 2001 counterpart: as explained in Section 5.1, it is a priori
unclear whether a deeper recession is associated with a higher or lower consumption response.
Overall, only a full quantitative analysis that contains all of these ingredients can shed light on
what accounted for the smaller impact on consumption of the 2008 stimulus program.
In calibrating our model, we have included the consumption ﬂow of large durables (notably,
housing and cars) as part of the return. Modeling durables explicitly (with a consumption
ﬂow proportional to the stock in the period utility function) would not aﬀect the response of
nondurable consumption to the rebate, as long as utility is separable in the two consumption
goods. However, such an extension could be useful to study the aggregate implications of the
policy for consumption and output in more detail. Unsurprisingly, as documented by JPS
(2006) and PSJM (2011), when durable goods are included among expenditures, the response
of household consumption to the rebate almost doubles.44
Given the high-frequency OLG structure, solving a stochastic version of our model in general
equilibrium (i.e., with asset returns determined endogenously and aggregate shocks) is not
numerically feasible (see Krueger and Kubler, 2004). To make progress in these directions, one
could develop an inﬁnite-horizon version of our economy (possibly with households transiting
randomly between work and retirement phases). To close the model, one would interpret the
illiquid asset a as productive capital with a return equal to its marginal product, whereas the
return on the liquid asset m could be pinned down by monetary policy (as in Ragot, 2011).
In this set up, one could also endow agents with rational beliefs over the probability that the
government will make ﬁscal stimulus payments during a recession, as in Heathcote (2005).
44See Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) for a recent example of an incomplete-markets model with durable and
nondurable consumption. As they emphasize, a crucial parameter aﬀecting households’ response to an income
shock is the degree of liquidity of durable goods.
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